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HIS article discusses legislative and judicial developments relating
to the Texas law of intestacy, wills, estate administration, trusts,
and other estate-planning matters during the Survey period from
November 2, 2004 through November 1, 2005. The reader is warned that
not all legislation enacted nor cases decided during the Survey period are
presented, and not all aspects of each cited statute or case are analyzed.
You must read and study the full text of each statute or case before rely-
ing on it or using it as precedent. The discussion of most cases includes a
moral that is the important lesson to be learned from the case. By recog-
nizing situations that have resulted in time-consuming and costly litiga-
tion in the past, the reader may be able to reduce the likelihood of the
same situations arising with his or her clients.
I. INTESTACY
The Texas 2005 Legislature made a significant change with respect to
the law governing inheritance by a person who is adopted as an adult.
Under prior law, there was no difference between the inheritance rights
of a person who was adopted as a minor and a person who was adopted
after reaching adulthood; that is, both types of adopted individuals inher-
ited not only from their adoptive parents but also retained the right to
inherit from their biological parents. With regard to intestate individuals
who die on or after September 1, 2005, the adopted adult may no longer
inherit from or through his or her biological parent.1
1. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 162.507(c) (Vernon Supp. 2006); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 40 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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This amendment may lead to an absurd result. For example, assume
that Mother and Father have a child in 1985. Mother dies in 1990 and
Father marries Step-Mother in 1995. As time passes, Child and Step-
Mother become close, and shortly after Child reaches age eighteen, Step-
Mother adopts Child. If Father dies intestate, Child will not be consid-
ered an heir because the statute provides that an adopted adult may not
inherit from a biological parent.
II. WILLS
A. TESTAMENTARY INTENT
In re Estate of Steed2 demonstrates that a jury's finding of lack of testa-
mentary intent must be supported by evidence that creates more than a
mere suspicion that a testator did not have intent to execute a will. In
this case, the jury determined that the testator's will was invalid because
he had no intent for the instrument to be his will. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the jury's finding of lack of testamentary intent was
so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it was
clearly wrong and unjust.3
The court studied the will itself and found that it was brimming with
testamentary intent. The testator was a lawyer who had a significant wills
practice. The testator's holographic will was labeled as a "last will and
testament," made a variety of gifts to his wife and family, and appointed
his wife as the independent executrix of the estate. The only evidence
negating the testator's testamentary intent was the testimony of individu-
als who simply "thought" that the testator did not mean the document to
be his will. There was no evidence of any unusual or extraordinary cir-
cumstances when the testator executed the will that would cast doubt on
his intent.4
B. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
Merely being old or acting in an eccentric or bizarre manner is not
enough to conclusively show lack of testamentary capacity. Further, if
the jury finds that the testator had testamentary capacity, a will contest-
ant will have a difficult time showing that the finding was so against the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence to be clearly wrong and
unjust. In the case of In re Estate of Trawick,5 the testatrix executed her
will, naming her niece as the sole beneficiary and executor. Her
grandchildren filed a will contest claiming that the testatrix lacked testa-
mentary capacity or was subject to the niece's undue influence. The jury
determined that the testatrix had testamentary capacity, and the
2. 152 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. denied).
3. Id. at 802, 812-14.
4. Id. at 812-14.
5. 170 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (addressing the testamen-





The appellate court affirmed. The court determined that the evidence
was factually sufficient to support the jury's finding of testamentary ca-
pacity. The court began its analysis by explaining that because the
grandchildren contested the will after its admission to probate, they had
the burden to show lack of capacity and to show that the jury's finding
was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The
court recognized that there was some evidence that would tend to show
lack of capacity. For example, the testatrix was ninety-two years old,
spoke of deceased persons as if they were still alive, sometimes was con-
fused about the date of her beauty-shop appointment, hid items in her
home, and sometimes had difficulty recognizing people. But, the court
determined that the jury was free to decide that testimony of the lawyer
who drafted the will, the attesting witnesses, and notary, along with the
testimony of her friends and acquaintances that the testatrix appeared to
know what she was doing had greater weight.7
C. FORMALITIES
1. Execution
In the case of In re Estate of Steed,8 a computer file on the testator's
computer contained a document labeled as the final draft of his will. No
signed copy of this will was presented to the court. The jury determined
that the testator never executed this will.9
On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the jury's finding was
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. The court
recognized the existence of a variety of suspicious circumstances, such as
the fact that the hard drives from the testator's computer were removed
by the proponents of the alleged will after the testator died and were not
recovered until several months later. However, there was testimony from
two witnesses and a notary that the testator had executed this will, al-
though the notary's record book did not reflect the execution of the self-
proving affidavit. The court's reversal, however, does not mean that this
will is valid or that the elements of proving a lost will were satisfied. In-
stead, the court merely determined that the jury's finding that the testator
did not execute the will was improper. 10
2. Attestation
In re Estate of Iversen" reinforces the fact that Texas has not adopted
6. Id. at 873.
7. Id. at 873, 876-80. The court also rejected the grandchildren's claim that an ex-
pert's testimony was improperly admitted because any objections were waived by their
failure to object timely. Id. at 876.
8. In re Estate of Steed, 152 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. denied).
9. Id. at 814.
10. Id. at 815-16.
11. 150 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
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the "substantial compliance" standard of the Uniform Probate Code.12
The probate court admitted the testator's typed, notarized will into pro-
bate even though it was unwitnessed. The court determined that the affi-
davits of two individuals who saw the testator sign the will were sufficient
to satisfy the attestation requirement because the will was in "substantial
compliance" with Texas Probate Code section 59(a). 13
The appellate court reversed. The court examined Probate Code sec-
tion 59(a) and determined that its requirements were straightforward;
that is, a non-holographic will must be attested to by at least two wit-
nesses "who subscribe their names thereto in their own handwriting. ... "
The court recognized that the notary could be counted as an attesting
witness, but that the will would still be one witness short. The court also
explained that the "substantial compliance" language of the Texas Pro-
bate Code applies to the form of the self-proving affidavit, not the will
itself. Accordingly, the testator died intestate. 14
3. Holographic Joint Will
The court in In re Estate of Capps15 followed the traditional Texas ap-
proach of treating non-holographic material to be mere surplusage if it
does not impact the dispositive scheme of the testatrix. A handwritten
will purported to dispose of two individuals estates. The evidence
showed that the substance of the will was entirely in the handwriting of
one of these two individuals. The appellate court sidestepped the issue of
whether this will was an attested will (that is, whether the signature of a
co-testatrix could be considered as the signature of a witness) and deter-
mined that the document was the holographic will of the scribing testa-
trix. The signature of the co-testatrix and the notary, as well as the
notary's jurat, were surplusage. Consistent with prior Texas law, non-ho-
lographic surplus material did not detract from the holographic character
of the will. 16
D. SELF-BENEFICIARY WILLS
Texas Probate Code section 58b was originally enacted in 1997 to void
testamentary gifts made to an attorney or someone closely connected to
the attorney who prepared the will. Despite the laudable intentions un-
derpinning this statute, it was rather inartfully drawn and has required
several amendments over the years. In 2005, the key amendment was to
the list of testamentary gifts that are deemed void unless they fall within
one of the exceptions (which have not changed). 17 Below is the list of
12. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990).
13. Iversen, 150 S.W.3d at 825-26.
14. Id. at 826.
15. 154 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.).
16. Id. at 243, 246-47. The more interesting, unaddressed question is whether a co-
testatrix's signature on a joint will may function as the signature of a witness.
17. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58b (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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void gifts assuming that the will was executed on or after September 1,
2005:
" Attorney who prepares the will,
" Attorney who supervises the preparation of the will,
" Parent of the attorney,
" Descendent of the attorney's parent (e.g., child, grandchild, brother,
sister, niece, nephew, etc.),
" Employee of the attorney, and
" Spouse of any of the above individuals.' 8
E. CONDITIONAL WILLS
In re Estate of Perez19 provides an example of a court giving effect to a
condition triggering the effectiveness of a will. The testator's will in-
cluded the following language: "because I am sick and waiting for a heart
surgery, and providing ahead of any emergency, I make the following dis-
position to be fulfilled in case my death occurs during the surgery. ' 20 The
testator did not die during the surgery. Instead, he died later at his sis-
ter's home. The lower court admitted the will to probate and denied the
contestants' motion for a summary judgment, which argued that the will
was not entitled to probate.2 1
The appellate court reversed. The court explained that the effective-
ness of the testator's will was conditioned on his death during the surgery.
Because he survived the surgery and died later, the will was ineffective.
The court recognized that statements of the reasons why a person is exe-
cuting a will are normally deemed inducements, not conditions. How-
ever, in this case, the testator's language was unambiguous that his will
was to be effective only if he died during the surgery.22
F. EFFECT OF DIVORCE
In the case of In re Estate of Nash,23 the testator's will left his entire
estate to his wife, but if his wife failed to survive him by thirty days, the
entire estate was to pass to his step-daughter. The testator later divorced
his wife but did not change his will. The wife outlived the testator by
more than thirty days. The trial court determined that the step-daughter
was entitled to the testator's estate, because as a result of the divorce, the
wife is treated as predeceasing the testator.24 Thus, the condition of the
step-daughter's gift was satisfied; that is, legally, the wife did not outlive
the testator by thirty days.25
18. Id. § 58b(a).
19. 155 S.W.3d 599 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.).
20. Id. at 601.
21. Id. at 600.
22. Id. at 601-02.
23. In re Estate of Nash, 164 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2005, pet. granted).
24. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69 (Vernon 2003).
25. Nash, 164 S.W.3d at 857.
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The appellate court reversed. The court recognized that Texas Probate
Code section 69 provides that the divorce causes the will to "be read as if
the former spouse failed to survive the testator. ' '26 However, the court
explained that this reading of the will is only with respect to provisions
"in favor of the testator's former spouse. '27 Because the alternative gift
was not to his wife, the wife was not legally dead with respect to the
condition on the step-daughter's gift. Since the wife was biologically alive
thirty days after the testator's death, the condition on the step-daughter's
gift was not satisfied. The testator's will lacked another alternative gift,
thus, the testator's estate passed by intestacy to his mother and brother. 28
This case shows that a testator who makes a testamentary gift to a
spouse should include express instructions in the will regarding the dispo-
sition to be made of that property if he or she is later divorced, paying
particular attention to gifts that are conditioned on the spouse predeceas-
ing the testator. Alternative gifts, unless to individuals who would also be
ex-relatives whom the testator would not want to benefit if a divorce oc-
curred, should state, "If [primary beneficiary] does not survive me by
[number] days or is otherwise unable to take under this provision of my
will, I leave this property to [alternative beneficiary]."
G. AMBIGUITY
Despite the clarity of language that a testator selects, individuals un-
happy with that language may nonetheless claim that the language is am-
biguous. For example, in Rogers v. Veigel Inter Vivos Trust No. 2,29 a
dispute arose as to whether certain gifts in the testator's will were (1)
outright gifts of life estates or (2) gifts in trust of life interests. The court
examined the face of the will and found that the testator's words were
unambiguous and not susceptible to more than one construction. Thus,
extrinsic evidence was not admissible to vary the plain meaning of the
testator's language under the seminal Texas Supreme Court holding in
San Antonio Area Foundation v. Lang.30 The testator clearly explained
that the gifts were for the beneficiaries' "lifetime" and referred to the
gifts as granting "a life estate." In addition, the testator created trusts in
the will by using trust language and naming trustees. 31
H. EXONERATION
Texas had long followed the doctrine of exoneration; that is, debts on
specifically gifted property were paid from other estate assets so that the
26. Id. at 861, 858 (quoting TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69).
27. Id. at 860 (quoting TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69(a)).
28. Id. at 857, 861. The court may have been attempting to reach the result that it
thought the testator would have wanted because relationships between former stepchildren
and stepparents can be problematic. The author wonders if the same result would have
been reached if the alternative gift had been to one of the testator's relatives or a charity.
29. 162 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2005, pet. denied).
30. 35 S.W.3d 636, 640 (Tex. 2000).
31. Rogers, 162 S.W.3d at 284-87.
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beneficiary received the asset unencumbered. 32 The doctrine has been
abolished for wills executed on or after September 1, 2005. A specific gift
now passes subject to each debt secured by the property that exists on the
date of the testator's death.33
The statute contains two special rules. First, the testator may expressly
provide in the will for the debts against a specific gift to be exonerated.
Note, however, that a general provision in the will stating that debts are
to be paid is not sufficient. Second, there is a new provision addressing
the situation in which a secured creditor elects matured secured claim
status as discussed later in this Article.34
I. UNDUE INFLUENCE
1. Overturning Jury Determination of Undue Influence
Although difficult, it is possible on appeal to overturn a jury's finding
that a testator was subject to undue influence. For example, in the case of
In re Estate of Steed,35 the jury determined that the testator's will was
invalid because he was subject to undue influence. The appellate court
reversed and held that the evidence was factually insufficient to support
the jury's finding.36
The appellate court began its analysis by stating the three-prong test of
undue influence adopted by the Texas Supreme Court: (1) the existence
and exertion of an influence (2) that subverted or overpowered the testa-
tor's mind when he executed the will (3) so that the testator executed a
will that he would not have executed but for the influence.37 The court
carefully examined the evidence, including the testator's statements to
others that he wrote the will to pacify his wife, the primary beneficiary, to
get her off the "warpath," and to curb her spending. But, when coupled
with other evidence, such as that the testator was a lawyer and accom-
plished businessman whose wife often lived over 500 miles away from
him, he wrote the will while alone, and he sent it to his wife in the mail,
there was insufficient evidence to support a jury finding of undue
influence.38
2. Summary Judgment of Lack of Undue Influence
A contestant alleging the invalidity of a will due to undue influence
must be able to produce evidence that undue influence was exerted. A
mere dissatisfaction with the disposition of property is not enough. For
example, in Cotten v. Cotten,39 two brothers, Neel and George, disagreed
32. See Currie v. Scott, 187 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1945).
33. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 71A(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
34. Id. § 71A(b)-(c); see discussion infra Part III.J.2.
35. 152 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. denied).
36. Id. at 812.
37. Id. at 807 (citing Rothermel v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1963)).
38. Id. at 807-10.
39. 169 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied).
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over the validity of their mother's will. At issue in this litigation was
whether George exercised undue influence over their mother when she
executed her estate-planning documents, including a will, trust, and fam-
ily limited partnership. The trial court granted summary judgment to
George, determining that Neel had failed to raise a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact on his undue-influence claim.40
The appellate court affirmed. The court explained that a court may not
infer undue influence by opportunity alone; there must be evidence to
show the exertion of undue influence. Evidence showed that their
mother was eighty-four years old and had survived a stroke. Although
this evidence may show susceptibility to influence, by itself, it is not
enough to show undue influence-especially in this case, because the tes-
tator was active, had just returned from a trip to Alaska, and was very
engaged in the estate-planning process. The court rejected a variety of
circumstances Neel raised, explaining that they did not demonstrate un-
due influence. For example, the court explained that the fact that
George's daughter lived with the testatrix did not create a fiduciary rela-
tionship between George and his mother. Also, the fact that George ben-
efited more than Neel from the estate plan was easily explained by the
strained relationship between Neel and his mother.4 1
J. WAIVER
To avoid assertions of waiver, proponents of a will should be certain to
plead and obtain findings to support the will, even if they think that the
will may have been revoked by a later will. In the case of In re Estate of
Steed,42 the probate court was presented with three wills. Two of the wills
were the subject of controversy, and the third, the earliest of the wills,
was undisputed. The trial court determined that, as a matter of law, the
probate of the earliest will was waived. The appellate court reversed and
held that there was no support in the record for a waiver. The parties
took no action to abandon this will, and because the will was self-proved,
it required no action from the jury to validate it.4 3
K. LoST WILL
1. Rebutting Revocation Presumption
In re Estate of Capps4 shows that the court may be willing to stretch
the evidence to uphold a lost will if the court truly believes that the dece-
dent intended to die testate. In this case, the testatrix's will could not be
found, so the will proponents were required to follow the requirements of
the Texas Probate Code and prove (1) that the original was duly exe-
cuted, (2) the reason why the original cannot be produced that satisfies
40. Id. at 826.
41. Id. at 827-28.
42. 152 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. denied).
43. Id. at 802, 817.
44. 154 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.).
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the court that it cannot be produced by any reasonable diligence, and (3)
the contents of the will by testimony of a credible witness who read the
will or heard it read.45 The trial court determined that the proponents
proved these three elements, and the contestants appealed.46
The appellate court affirmed. The court admitted that the original will
was last seen in the testatrix's possession, which raised a presumption that
she destroyed it with the intention to revoke. But, the court determined
that there was sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. For example, the testatrix arranged for the prin-
cipal beneficiaries to have copies of the will, at a church meeting she
announced her intention to leave her property as set forth in the will, she
continued to have affection for the beneficiaries named in the will, and
she was the type of person who would have told others if she had revoked
the will. 47
2. Evidence to Show Will Has Been Lost
In the case of In re Estate of Berger,48 the beneficiary of an alleged will
attempted to prove that the decedent executed a valid attested will. The
court granted a summary judgment against the beneficiary, stating that
she did not produce sufficient evidence to raise a fact issue regarding the
existence of the will. The appellate court reversed.49
Rule of Evidence 1004 permits the admission of other evidence of a
writing if the original has been lost or destroyed. The court examined
evidence, such as the beneficiary's affidavit that she saw the will four days
before the decedent's death as well as after the decedent's death. She
also remembered seeing the last page of the will and that it contained the
notarized signatures of the decedent and two witnesses. The court held
that there was more than a scintilla of evidence that the will was lost,
which precluded a summary judgment against the beneficiary. 50
L. FAMILY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
To be enforceable, a family settlement agreement must explain how the
decedent's estate is to be distributed.51 The problems that result from
failing to remember this basic principle are evident from the case of In re
Estate of Halbert.52 The testatrix died, leaving behind three instruments
with disparate distribution schemes that could be deemed to be her last
will. A dispute arose as to which of these documents should be probated
as her will. The beneficiaries of each potential will signed a mediated
45. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 85 (Vernon 2003).
46. Capps, 154 S.W.3d at 243-44.
47. Id. at 245-46.
48. 174 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, no pet.).
49. Id. at 846, 849.
50. Id. at 849.
51. See In re Estate of Morris, 577 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
52. 172 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. denied).
1614 [Vol. 59
Wills and Trusts
settlement agreement. Later, however, one of the beneficiaries disputed
the validity of the settlement agreement and sought to have it declared
unenforceable. The trial court held that the agreement was valid.5 3
The appellate court reversed. The court explained that the agreement
not to probate the testatrix's will did not contain an alternative distribu-
tion scheme and thus was unenforceable. The court recognized that "[a]
family settlement agreement is an alternative method of administration in
Texas that is a favorite of the law."'54 However, an agreement not to pro-
bate a will must be accompanied by an agreement stating how the dece-
dent's property is to be distributed. The court examined the settlement
agreement and found that it contained neither an express nor implied
distribution scheme, such as to probate one of the three wills or to have
the testatrix's estate pass by intestacy.5 5
III. ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
A. STANDING
A person seeking to establish the right to inherit as a common-law
spouse must make careful strategic decisions on how to proceed in order
to make certain that he or she is not inadvertently precluded from pursu-
ing the claim. For example, in the case of In re Estate of Armstrong,56 the
testator's daughter was appointed as the temporary administratrix of the
testator's estate after she submitted an application to which she attached
a copy of the testator's will. The alleged common-law wife ("ACLW")
contested, asserting that the testator had revoked the will. The daughter
agreed and thereafter claimed that the testator died intestate. She sought
to be appointed as the administratrix and urged the court to determine
heirship. Instead, the probate court appointed a third party as a succes-
sor temporary administrator because of the dispute over whether the tes-
tator was married to ACLW when he died. After complex procedural
maneuvering, the probate court determined in a motion in limine that
ACLW was not the testator's wife, was not an interested person with
standing, and was not able to intervene in the case to dispute the payment
of various estate expenses. The court also determined that she was pre-
cluded from presenting the issue of her marital status to a jury in the
heirship proceeding. The court reasoned that the in limine finding that
she was not married to the testator was conclusive for purposes of the
heirship proceeding. 57
After a careful review of similar Texas cases, the appellate court held
that the probate court's determination of standing at the in limine hearing
was a collateral matter to the issue of the propriety of the payment of
administration expenses. Accordingly, this finding was not conclusive for
53. Id. at 195-96.
54. Id. at 199.
55. Id. at 201.
56. 155 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.).
57. Id. at 449-52.
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purposes of the heirship proceeding and ACLW was not barred from
seeking a jury trial in the heirship action.58
B. JURISDIcrION
1. Testamentary Trusts
Amendments made in 2003 to Texas Probate Code section 5 caused
confusion regarding the jurisdiction of a statutory probate court over tes-
tamentary trusts. Section 5(e), effective with regard to actions filed on or
after September 1, 2005, makes it clear that a statutory probate court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in all actions involving a
testamentary trust.59
2. Actions by or against a Trustee
Several recent cases had held that "[t]he mere fact that a plaintiff hap-
pens to be a trustee, however, does not transfer a case into one 'concern-
ing trusts"' thereby giving a statutory probate court jurisdiction over the
case.60 Texas Probate Code section 5(e) was amended to reverse the ef-
fect of these cases with respect to an action filed on or after September 1,
2005. The section now provides that the statutory probate court has juris-
diction "in all actions by or against a trustee. '61
3. Pre-Contest Request for a Statutory Probate Court Judge
As amended, Texas Probate Code section 5(b-1) permits a party to a
probate case, pending in a constitutional county court, to file a motion for
the assignment of a statutory probate court judge even before the matter
becomes contested. If the matter is actually contested at a later time, the
amendment requires the constitutional county court judge to grant the
pre-contest motion and prevents the judge from transferring the case to a
district court instead.62
The amendment also provides that if the constitutional county court
judge had previously transferred the case to a district court using author-
ity granted elsewhere (that is, not because of a contest), the party still has
the right to have the matter assigned to a statutory probate court judge.63
4. Sale of Property Not Completely Owned by Decedent
Walker v. Walker64 confirms that the probate court may issue an order
to sell estate property even if an interest in that property is owned by
58. Id. at 455.
59. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(e) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
60. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shores, 128 S.W.3d 718, 725 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004,
no pet.); see also Shell Cortez Pipeline Co. v. Shores, 127 S.W.3d 286 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2004, no pet.).
61. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(e).
62. Id. § 5(b-1).
63. Id. § 5(b-1)(2).
64. 152 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).
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someone other than the decedent. A mother, who died with a valid will,
left her interest in a home equally to her two daughters (Pattie and Bar-
bara), each of whom had already inherited a one-quarter interest from
their father, who had previously died intestate. Pattie served as the inde-
pendent executor but allegedly breached her fiduciary duties by living in
the house without paying rent or compensating the estate for her use of
the house. Barbara successfully had Pattie removed as the independent
executor and secured the appointment of a third party as a dependent
executor ("Executor"). Executor obtained court permission to sell the
house. Pattie appealed, raising a variety of jurisdictional issues, including
an assertion that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the sale of the
house.65
The appellate court affirmed. Pattie claimed that Executor had no au-
thority to sell the house and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue
an order to sell the house because only one-half of the house was in the
mother's estate. The court examined the Texas Probate Code and case
law and found nothing to support Pattie's claim that all joint owners must
join in a partition request in order for the court to have jurisdiction to
issue an order of sale. The court explained that the probate court's juris-
diction extended to the one-half interest that their mother did not own
under Probate Code section 5A(b) because the partition action was inci-
dent to her estate. 66
5. Transfer to District Court from County Court
When a district court receives a case transferred from a county court,
the district court has jurisdiction to determine only the contested issues,
not all issues remaining in the case. The importance of remembering this
principle is shown by Krumnow v. Krumnow.67 The testator's will was
admitted to probate in a constitutional county court, and the executor
duly qualified as the personal representative. Later, an application was
filed to remove the executor from office and to have a successor ap-
pointed. The county court transferred the case to the district court under
Texas Probate Code section 5(b). Initially, the district court declined to
remove the executor but later removed the executor and appointed a suc-
cessor. Subsequently, the executor filed a motion to have this order va-
cated, and the district court scheduled a hearing to resolve all matters
involving the testator's will and inter vivos trust, including the appoint-
ment of a receiver. The district court denied the executor's motion and
appointed a receiver. The executor appealed. 68
The appellate court first examined whether the district court had juris-
diction to issue its orders. The court agreed that the district court had
jurisdiction over whether the executor should be removed from office be-
65. Id. at 221-22.
66. Id. at 223-25.
67. 174 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, pet. filed).
68. Id. at 824-25.
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cause this was a contested matter under Probate Code section 5(b) and
was thus eligible for transfer from the county court to the district court.
However, the district court lacked jurisdiction to appoint a successor per-
sonal representative. The district court had jurisdiction to resolve only
the contested matter (whether to remove the executor), after which the
case should have returned to the county court for further proceedings
(the appointment of a successor personal representative). Accordingly,
the court vacated the district court's appointment of a successor personal
representative. 69
C. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
1. Bill of Review
The trial court in In re Estate of Davidson70 denied a bill of review
under Probate Code section 31, but did not sever it from the underlying
will contest. The moving party appealed. The appellate court dismissed
the appeal and held that it lacked jurisdiction because the order denying
the bill of review was not a final and appealable order. The court ex-
plained that the ultimate issue was whether the court's order admitting
the will to probate should be set aside. In addition to the bill-of-review
pleading, the will contestants also filed a traditional will contest under
Probate Code section 93, which had not yet been decided. 71 Because the
issues overlapped and the court had not yet ruled on all issues, the ruling
on the bill of review was not a final and appealable order as required by
Crowson v. Wakeham.72
2. Conflicting Probate Applications
The will proponents in the case of In re Estate of Gomez73 attempted to
probate the testator's will, which was executed in 1991. The contestants
claimed that the testator executed a new will in 2000 that revoked the
1991 will. The proponents responded that the 2000 will was invalid be-
cause the testator lacked testamentary capacity and was subject to undue
influence. The probate court agreed with the proponents that the 2000
will was invalid, but did not rule on the validity of the 1991 will. The
contestants appealed but then sought to abate the appeal. The appellate
court ordered briefing on the issue as to whether the probate court's or-
der was appealable. 74
The court held that the probate court's order was not appealable. The
court began its analysis by quoting the test for determining whether a
probate court order is appealable as set forth by the Texas Supreme
Court in Crowson v. Wakeham:
69. Id. at 825, 830.
70. 153 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied).
71. Id. at 302, 304.
72. Id.; Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995).
73. In re Estate of Gomez, 161 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet.).
74. Id. at 615-16.
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If there is an express statute ... declaring the phase of the probate
proceedings to be final and appealable, that statute controls. Other-
wise, if there is a proceeding of which the order in question may
logically be considered a part, but one or more pleadings also part of
that proceeding raise issues or parties not disposed of, then the pro-
bate order is interlocutory. 75
The Gomez court explained that Texas Probate Code section 83(a)
governs the procedure to be followed if there is a second application for
the probate of a will and the original application has not yet been heard;
that is, "the court shall hear both applications together and determine
what instrument, if any, should be admitted to probate. ' 76 This provision
is an example of an "express statute" in the Crowson test and "controls
the finality of a judgment when two competing will applications are pend-
ing because it dictates the procedure to be followed by the trial court. '77
Because the probate court had not yet ruled on the validity of the 1991
will, the court held that the judgment denying the application to probate
the 2000 will was not yet appealable.7 8
D. VENUE
1. Survival and Wrongful-Death Actions
In Gonzalez v. Reliant Energy, Inc.,79 the Supreme Court of Texas
makes it clear that venue for wrongful-death and survival actions is deter-
mined according to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code sec-
tion 15.007, not the Texas Probate Code. In this case, the decedent was
killed in a work-related accident in Fort Bend County. When he died, the
decedent's residence was in Hidalgo County. Accordingly, under Texas
Probate Code section 6, administration of the decedent's estate was
opened in Hidalgo County. The court held that the proper venue for the
administrator's wrongful-death claim was in Harris County-the county
in which the decedent's employer had its principal place of business-
because the venue provisions of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
section 15.007, which deals with actions by or against a personal represen-
tative for personal injury, death, or property damage, trump the applica-
ble venue provisions of the Texas Probate Code. 80
The court extensively analyzed the jurisdictional and venue provisions
of the Probate Code. The court explained that the plain language of sec-
tion 15.007 provides that its method of venue determination is superior to
75. Crowson, 897 S.W.2d at 783.
76. Gomez, 161 S.W.3d at 616 (quoting TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 83(a) (Vernon
2003)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 617.
79. 159 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. 2005). On the same day, the Supreme Court of Texas re-
solved a conflicting lower-court case involving similar facts by conditionally granting man-
damus directing a probate court to vacate its order that had granted a transfer motion
under Probate Code section 5B. In re Terex Corp., 159 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. 2005).
80. Gonzalez, 159 S.W.3d at 617, 621.
2006] 1619
SMU LAW REVIEW
the Probate Code venue provisions. Accordingly, section 15.007 limits
the statutory probate court's discretionary authority under Probate Code
section 5B to transfer to itself a wrongful-death, personal-injury, or prop-
erty-damage case in which a personal representative of an estate pending
in that court is a party unless the county where the probate court is lo-
cated would also be a county of proper venue under Civil Practice and
Remedies Code section 15.002.81
2. Multiple Residences
Texas Probate Code section 6(a) provides that, for the administration
of an estate, venue is in the county where the decedent resided if the
decedent had a domicile or fixed place of residence in Texas.82 In In re
Estate of Steed 83 the decedent had several residences. The appellate
court, following earlier Texas case law, explained that the Probate Code
section, although perhaps inartfully written, provides that venue is in the
county of the decedent's domicile at the time of death. The court held
that "venue is established based on the domicile of the decedent and that
the multiple residence authorization for venue ... does not apply to the
probate venue statute. '84 The court also explained that a domicile deter-
mination requires that the decedent (1) made it an actual residence and
(2) intended to make it a permanent home.85
E. SURVIVAL AcTION
1. Standing and Capacity
The relevant facts of the Texas Supreme Court cases of Austin Nursing
Center, Inc. v. Lovato8 6 and Lorentz v. Dunn87 are similar. Before the
statute of limitations ran on a decedent's negligence claim, the plaintiff
petitioned to be appointed as the decedent's personal representative.
Before being appointed, the plaintiff filed a survival action, which falsely
stated that she had already been properly appointed by the court. The
plaintiff was later appointed; however, by that time, the statute of limita-
tions had already run. In both cases, the trial courts dismissed the sur-
vival actions, holding that the plaintiffs did not have standing when they
filed the cases. The plaintiffs appealed.88
81. Id. at 620-22. The result in this case appears to have been codified by the 2003
Texas Legislature in House Bill 4, which amended Probate Code sections 5A, 5B, and 607
to provide that venue of an action by or against a personal representative for personal
injury, death, or property damage is determined under section 15.007. Tex. H.B. 4, 78th
Leg., R.S. (2003).
82. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 6(a) (Vernon 2003).
83. 152 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. denied).
84. Id. at 804.
85. Id.
86. 171 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. 2005).
87. 171 S.W.3d 854 (Tex. 2005).
88. Lorentz, 171 S.W.3d at 855; Austin, 171 S.W.3d at 846.
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The appellate courts reached different results. In Austin, the court held
that the plaintiff had standing to bring the suit because her appointment
after the statute-of-limitations expired related back to filing of the origi-
nal complaint, which was within the statute of limitations period. 89 On
the other hand, the Lorentz court determined that the plaintiff lacked
standing because she had not been appointed either when she filed the
survival action or when the statute of limitations had run. Once ap-
pointed, her standing did not relate back to the time of filing.90
The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed Austin and reversed Lorentz.91
The court stressed the distinction between standing and capacity, both of
which are required before a person may properly bring a lawsuit. The
court stated that, "[tihe issue of standing focuses on whether a party has a
sufficient relationship with the lawsuit so as to have a 'justiciable interest'
in its outcome, whereas the issue of capacity is 'conceived of as a proce-
dural issue dealing with the personal qualifications of a party to liti-
gate."' 92  Standing deals with whether the plaintiff is "personally
aggrieved," whereas capacity refers to the "legal authority to sue" even if
the party has no justiciable interest.93
Although the court recognized the long line of Texas cases holding that
a decedent's estate is not a legal entity that can sue or be sued, the court
nonetheless stated that "in a survival action, the decedent's estate has a
justiciable interest in the controversy sufficient to confer standing. '94
The court then reasoned that, because the estate had standing to sue, the
plaintiff acquired the capacity to assert the survival claim after she was
appointed as the estate's personal representative. The court explained
that her late-acquired capacity cured her failure to have capacity before
the statute of limitations expired. 95
Surprisingly, the court was not greatly concerned about the false state-
ments made by the plaintiffs in their pleadings. The court merely said
that the trial court has the discretion to address the misrepresentations. 96
Traditionally, in Texas, an estate is not a legal entity that can sue or be
sued.97 The Supreme Court of Texas has now made an exception for sur-
vival actions by granting a decedent's estate standing to sue even though
no one has been appointed as the decedent's personal representative.
These decisions will make it easier for lawsuits to be filed very close to
89. Lovato v. Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc., 113 S.W.3d 45, 53-55 (Tex. App.-Austin
2003), afjfd 171 S.W.3d. 845 (Tex. 2005).
90. Lorentz v. Dunn, 112 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003), rev'd 171
S.W.3d 854 (Tex. 2005).
91. Lorentz, 171 S.W.3d at 855; Austin, 171 S.W.3d at 846.
92. Austin, 171 S.W.3d at 848 (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER,
& MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1559, at 441 (2d
ed. 1990)).
93. Id. at 848-49.
94. Id. at 850.
95. Id. at 851-53.
96. Lorentz, 171 S.W.3d at 856; Austin, 171 S.W.3d at 853.
97. Austin, 171 S.W.3d at 849.
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the expiration of the statute of limitations because it is not necessary for
the plaintiff to secure the prior appointment of a personal representative.
2. Tolling of Statute of Limitations
If the heirs are minors, survival actions may be heard many years after
the decedent's death because the statute of limitations is tolled. For ex-
ample, in County of Dallas v. Sempe,98 a prisoner was killed by a fellow
inmate during a jailhouse fight. His children brought a survival action
alleging that the prisoner's death was the result of the jail being over-
crowded. The County claimed that the children lacked standing to bring
the survival action. The appellate court explained that because the chil-
dren waited until more than four years from the date of the prisoner's
death to sue, they were not required to allege that there was no adminis-
tration pending and that none was necessary. In addition, they were not
required to file suit within the four-year period for instituting probate
proceedings. The statute of limitations on the prisoner's claim had not
run when he died and was tolled during the children's minority.99
3. Standing of Heir
An heir may bring a survival action if (1) an administration of the dece-
dent's estate is not pending and (2) no administration is necessary.100
However, to avoid the type of litigation that occurred in Pratho v.
Zapata, 01 it may be better practice to have a personal representative ap-
pointed to bring the action. In Pratho, the decedent died from a heart
attack. His heirs asserted that a doctor's failure to diagnose his heart
condition hastened his death. The suit was, however, not brought by the
personal representative of the decedent's estate, which is normally the
case. Instead, the decedent's widow and children brought the action. The
jury determined that the doctor was negligent. However, the court
granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the doctor on
the survival claim (the decedent's pain and suffering before death) be-
cause his widow lacked standing. His widow appealed. 10 2
The appellate court reversed. Typically, the personal representative of
a decedent's estate is the proper person to bring a survival action.10 3
However, the court explained that the widow had standing in this case
because (1) an administration of the decedent's estate was not pending
and (2) no administration was necessary. 0 4 It was true that the widow
had requested letters of administration, but her request was not granted
until two months after the jury's verdict. The court held that an estate is
not pending until a personal representative is actually appointed. Thus,
98. 151 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. granted).
99. Id. at 294, 296-97.
100. 157 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 835-36.
103. See Shepherd v. Ledford, 962 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tex. 1998).
104. Pratho, 157 S.W.3d at 840-41.
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at the time of the trial, the decedent's estate was not pending, and there
was no personal representative who could have brought the suit. 10 5
The court was not troubled by the fact that, after the trial but before
the judgment, the widow received administration letters. The court de-
termined that the trial court should have granted her post-trial motion to
change the plaintiff, even though she filed the motion outside the statute
of limitations. The amended petition would relate back to the earlier pe-
tition because the widow had pleaded and proved standing as an heir at
the time of trial. 106
The court was, however, initially concerned with the widow's compli-
ance with the requirement that no probate was necessary. She made con-
flicting assertions. At trial, she stated that no administration was
necessary (that is, estate debts were paid, and there was an agreement
regarding the distribution of estate assets). However, in her application
for letters in probate court, she asserted that a necessity existed. The
court determined that the conflicting assertions were not relevant-what
was important was the situation that actually existed at the time of trial.
The evidence showed that, at the time of the trial, no need for an admin-
istration of the decedent's estate existed-the debts had been paid, and
the heirs had agreed to a distribution of his estate. 0 7
F. TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATION
For the estates of decedents who die on or after June 17, 2005, the
person appointed as a temporary administrator has a longer time to file
bond with the county clerk. Under prior law, the filing had to be done on
the date of the order. Now, the appointee has until the third business day
after the date of the order.108 "Business day" is defined as a day "other
than a Saturday, Sunday, or holiday recognized by [Texas].' 0 9
G. FORMER GUARDIANSHIP PROPERTY
In re Guardianship of Bayne110 explains that once the estate guardian
for a deceased ward transfers property to the personal representative of
the ward's estate, the guardian can no longer regain control of the prop-
erty. In this case, the court ordered the guardian to transfer the ward's
property to the independent executor after the ward's death. The guard-
ian complied. Later, however, the guardian obtained an order from the
trial court requiring the executor to re-transfer some of the ward's prop-
105. Id. at 839-40.
106. Id. at 847. This principle was later confirmed by the Supreme Court of Texas in
Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. 2005). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 86-97.
107. Id. at 840-41. A concurring justice in a lengthy opinion advocated that "[t]he re-
quirement that heirs must plead and prove no administration is pending and none is neces-
sary should not be applied to statutory survival actions." Id. at 855.
108. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 131A(d) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
109. Id.
110. 171 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied).
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erty to the guardian. The appellate court held that the trial court had no
authority to issue this order. The court examined the Texas Probate Code
and was unable to locate a provision that would permit the trial court to
issue such an order. Accordingly, the appellate court vacated the
order.1 11
H. APPRAISERS
Texas Probate Code section 248 was amended to require that good
cause be shown before a court may appoint appraisers, either on the
court's own motion or upon the application of an interested party.1 12
I. HOMESTEAD
Amendments to Texas Probate Code sections 271 and 272 make it clear
that the homestead may be set aside and delivered only to the surviving
spouse or minor children. 113 Under the prior wording of the statute, the
homestead could arguably be set aside for unmarried children remaining
with the family of the decedent. These amendments finally bring the stat-
utes into conformity with the 115-year-old Texas Supreme Court case of
Zwernemann v. Von Rosenburg,"4 which held that similar language in a
prior version of the statute was contrary to the Texas Constitution.' 1 5
J. CLAIMS OF CREDITORS
1. Procedure in Independent Administration
The trial court in the case of In re Guardianship of Bayne"1 6 ordered
the independent executor to pay a specified debt. The appellate court
vacated the order because the creditor had not followed the procedures
specified in the Texas Probate Code. The creditor neither filed a claim
with the executor nor filed suit against the executor. The appellate court
explained that the trial court's order was an "unwarranted intrusion into
the independent administration of the estate. 1 17
2. Secured Claims
Because of the repeal of the common-law doctrine of exoneration by
Texas Probate Code section 71A, discussed above, 1 18 Probate Code sec-
tion 306 was amended to address the situation in which a secured creditor
elects matured secured claim status." 9 First, the personal representative
111. Id. at 234-35, 238-39.
112. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 248. Note that this change was included in two enacted
bills (SB 347 and H.B. 3434) but with slightly different language.
113. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 271-72.
114. 13 S.W. 485 (Tex. 1890).
115. Id. at 486.
116. 171 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied).
117. Id. at 237-38.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 33 and 34.
119. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 306(c-1) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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is required to collect from the beneficiary the amount of the debt and pay
that amount to the secured creditor. If there is more than one beneficiary
of the encumbered property, each pays a pro-rata share of the debt. 20
Second, if the personal representative is unable to collect enough
money to pay off the debt, the property is sold. The proceeds of the sale
are first used to pay the debt and any expenses associated with the sale.
If there is a surplus, it will be divided pro-rata among the beneficiaries of
the specific gift. If there is a deficiency, the creditor has an unsecured
claim for that amount. 12 1
3. Class 2 Claims
With regard to the estates of decedents who die on or after September
1, 2005, an amendment to Texas Probate Code section 322 expanded
Class 2 claims. 122 Class 2 claims now include not only the administration
expenses triggered by the decedent's death, but also the unpaid expenses
awarded in a guardianship of the decedent. This change prevents these
expenses from losing the priority status they enjoyed under Probate Code
section 805 while the decedent-ward was alive.' 23
K. SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
An order appointing a successor personal representative should set
bond the Probate Code requires. Ayala v. Mackie12 4 shows the type of
problem that may arise if this is not done. The probate court denied the
applicant's motion to be named as a successor executor of an ancillary
estate and appointed Mackie instead. An appeal ensued.12 5
The appellants first argued that the probate court abused its discretion
in determining that there was a continuing need for administration and
the appointment of a successor personal representative. The appellate
court disagreed because a review of the evidence revealed a complicated
estate administration including a host of lawsuits and appeals. 126
The court then reviewed the probate court's determination that the ap-
plicant was unsuitable to serve as a personal representative under Pro-
bate Code section 78(e). The court held that the probate court's denial
was not an abuse of discretion because there was evidence of conflicts of
interest. 127
The court, however, agreed with the appellants that the probate court
improperly appointed Mackie because the order did not set bond, and
Mackie did not file bond. 128 Although the probate court did not abuse its
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322 (Vernon 2005).
123. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 805(4)(b) (Vernon 2003).
124. 158 S.W.3d 568 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. granted).
125. Id. at 570-71.
126. Id. at 571.
127. Id. at 572.
128. Id. at 573; see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 195, 194, 181(c) (Vernon 2003).
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discretion in appointing Mackie, the failure to require a bond made the
probate court's order voidable. The court remanded the case to the pro-
bate court for further proceedings, presumably for setting bond as re-
quired by the Probate Code. 129
L. SURETY LIABILITY
Sierad v. Barnett130 emphasizes that a surety who wishes to escape lia-
bility for the evil acts of a personal representative should make its best
case at the trial level because of the difficulty of overturning a finding of
liability on appeal. After the intestate's death, the court appointed his
daughter as the administrator and required the posting of bond. After a
complicated series of events and legal actions, the court determined that
the daughter had breached her fiduciary duties and rendered a judgment
against her and her surety. The surety appealed. 131
The surety argued that the evidence was insufficient to show that the
daughter's acts and omissions caused economic loss to the trust. The trial
court enumerated a list of a dozen ways in which the daughter had wasted
or converted estate assets, such as living in the intestate's house without
paying rent and not making the mortgage payments. The appellate court
reviewed the evidence supporting the trial court's conclusions and held
that the findings were not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the
evidence so as to be clearly wrong or unjust. Accordingly, the court
agreed with the trial court that the surety was liable. 132
IV. TRUSTS133
A. STATUTE OF FRAUDS
1. Lack of Writing
Ayers v. Mitchell 134 demonstrates the problems that arise when a trust
is not properly documented in a writing. Mother, Father, Daughter, and
Son opened a joint bank account consisting of funds contributed by
Mother and Father. Over time, Daughter obtained sole control over
these funds and refused to return them to Father after Mother's death.
The trial court determined that Mother and Father had created an irrevo-
cable oral trust with Daughter as the trustee and thus agreed with Daugh-
ter that Father could not regain the funds. The appellate court
reversed. 135
The court began its analysis with Texas Property Code section 112.004,
which provides that a trust must be in writing unless it satisfies the oral
129. Id.
130. 164 S.W.3d 471 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).
131. Id. at 475-76.
132. Id. at 477-79.
133. Unless otherwise stated, all statutory changes impacting trusts discussed in this
section took effect on January 1, 2006.
134. 167 S.W.3d 924 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.).
135. Id. at 926.
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trust exception for personal property. For an oral trust of personal prop-
erty to be enforceable, there must be a transfer of trust property to a
trustee who is neither the settlor nor a beneficiary, provided the trans-
feror expresses trust intent either at or before the time of the transfer.1 36
The court reviewed the facts and determined that Father had not made a
completed transfer of the bank account funds, and thus no trust existed
even though Father had expressed the requisite trust intent. 137
The court recognized that the Trust Code does not define the term
"transfer." After examining cases dealing with the ownership of funds in
multiple-party accounts, the court held that a transfer "must divest the
[settlor] of all dominion and control over the trust res.' 138 Father did not
transfer the funds because he remained on the account and thus had the
right to make withdrawals at any time. In addition, there was evidence of
several occasions on which Father directed the use of the funds in the
account.139
2. Lost Trust Instrument
A settlor should locate a safe repository for the trust instrument so that
it is not lost, inadvertently destroyed, or concealed. The problems that
may result if this is not done are reflected in the case of In re Estate of
Berger.140 A beneficiary of an alleged trust attempted to prove that the
decedent created an inter vivos trust but was unable to produce the trust
instrument. The court granted a summary judgment against the benefici-
ary stating that she did not produce sufficient evidence to raise a fact
issue regarding the existence of a trust. The appellate court reversed. 141
The court recognized that a trust of real property requires "written evi-
dence of the trust's terms bearing the signature of the settlor or the set-
tlor's authorized agent. 1 42 However, Rule of Evidence 1004 permits the
admission of other evidence related to the contents of a writing if the
original has been lost or destroyed. The court examined evidence such as
the beneficiary's affidavit that she saw the trust instrument both before
and after the decedent's death and was able to recall significant details
about the first page of the document, including a listing of the trust prop-
erty, the identity of the beneficiary, and the trust purpose. Consequently,
the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to raise a fact issue
regarding the existence of a trust, which precluded a summary
judgment. 143
136. Id. at 928.
137. Id. at 928-30.
138. Id. at 929.
139. Id. at 929-30. In dicta, the court explained that even if Father had created a trust,
it would have been revocable, and the evidence established its revocation. For example,
Father's filing this lawsuit and asking for his money would have revoked any trust that he
may have created. Id. at 930.
140. 174 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, no pet.).
141. Id. at 846, 849.
142. Id. at 847 (quoting TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.004 (Vernon 1995)).
143. Id. at 847-48.
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B. EFFECT OF DIVORCE
The 2005 Texas Legislature added sections 471-473 to the Probate
Code (not the Trust Code) to address what happens if the settlor and
beneficiary of a revocable trust are divorced and the settlor fails to
amend the trust to address this change in circumstance. 144
1. Effective Date
The new provisions apply only if the settlor creates the trust on or after
September 1, 2005 and the divorce occurs thereafter. 14 5 Thus, the prop-
erty interest of spouse-beneficiaries of pre-September 1, 2005 trusts will
not be affected by a subsequent divorce, even if that divorce is after the
legislation's effective date.
2. Types of Trusts Covered
Only written revocable trusts are covered by the new provisions. 146
The ex-spouse remains the beneficiary of an irrevocable trust and of a
revocable oral trust.
3. Effect of Divorce or Annulment
a. Provisions Statutorily Revoked
If the settlor of a written revocable trust divorces a beneficiary of that
trust to whom the settlor was married before or at the time of trust crea-
tion, the following trust provisions in favor of the ex-spouse are automati-
cally revoked:
" Beneficiary of a revocable disposition or appointment,
" Donee of a general or special power of appointment, and
* Designation as a fiduciary (e.g., trustee, personal representative,
agent, or guardian). 14 7
b. Effect of Statutory Revocation
Any property interest that is automatically revoked passes as if the ex-
spouse executed a valid disclaimer of that interest under Texas law. If a
fiduciary designation is automatically revoked, the trust instrument is
read as if the ex-spouse died immediately before the dissolution of the
marriage.148
144. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 471-73 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
145. Act of June 17, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 551, § 8, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 551.
146. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 472.
147. Id. § 472(a).




The automatic revocation of provisions in favor of the ex-spouse dis-
cussed above does not occur if one or more of the following instruments
provides otherwise:
* A trust executed after the divorce,
* A court order,
* Express language in the trust, or
* Express language of a contract relating to the division of the marital
estate entered into before, during, or after the marriage. 149
5. Bona Fide Purchaser Protection
A bona fide purchaser from the ex-spouse of trust property or a person
who receives a payment from the ex-spouse that is traceable to the trust
does not have to return the property or payment and is not liable for that
property or payment. 5°
6. Duty of Ex-Spouse to Return Improper Receipts
If the ex-spouse receives property or a payment from a trust to which
the ex-spouse is not entitled, the ex-spouse has a duty to return the prop-
erty or payment and is personally liable to the person who is entitled to
that property or payment.' 51
C. NON-WAIVABLE TRUST CODE PROVISIONS
Under former Trust Code section 111.002, the terms of the trust pre-
vailed over conflicting Trust Code rules except that the settlor could not
waive certain self-dealing duties of corporate trustees. New section
111.0035 greatly expands the list of non-waivable items and provides de-
tailed rules with regard to the waiver of certain trustee duties. 152
1. Trust Purposes
The settlor may not change the restriction in Trust Code section
112.031 that a trust may not be created for an illegal purpose or require
the trustee to commit a criminal or tortious act or an act that is contrary
to public policy. 153
2. Self-Dealing Duties of Corporate Trustees
Consistent with prior law, the settlor may not waive certain self-dealing
duties for corporate trustees regarding the buying, selling, and lending of
149. Id. § 472(a).
150. Id. § 473(a).
151. Id. § 473(b).
152. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.0035 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
153. Id. § 111.0035(b)(1); see id. § 112.031.
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trust property under Trust Code sections 113.052 and 113.053.154
3. Trustee Exculpation
In a new section, discussed below, the rules regarding trustee exculpa-
tion are recodified and expanded.1 55 The settlor is prohibited from re-
stricting the limitations on exculpation imposed by this section.156
4. Statute of Limitations
The settlor may not shorten the periods of limitation for commencing a
judicial proceeding regarding a trust.1 57
5. Trustee's Duty to Account for Irrevocable Trusts
The settlor may not limit the duty of a trustee of an irrevocable trust to
respond to a beneficiary's demand for an accounting under Trust Code
section 113.151, provided that the beneficiary is either (1) entitled or per-
mitted to receive trust distributions or (2) would receive a distribution
from the trust if the trust terminated at the time of the demand.158
Note that the settlor may restrict the trustee's duty to account in other
situations, such as (1) if the trust is revocable or (2) if the beneficiaries of
the irrevocable trust are remote (that is, they are not eligible for current
distributions or a distribution if the trust were to terminate). 159
6. Trustee's Duty of Good Faith
The settlor may not limit the trustee's duty to act in good faith and in
accordance with the purposes of the trust.160
7. Trustee's Duty to Inform Beneficiaries
Generally, the settlor may not limit the trustee's duty under a new sec-
tion, discussed below, to keep the beneficiaries informed about the ad-
ministration of the trust and the material facts that the beneficiaries need
to protect their interests. 16' There are three important exceptions-that
is, three situations in which the settlor may limit the trustee's duty to
inform the beneficiaries:
" The trust is revocable,
" The beneficiary of an irrevocable trust is under age twenty-five, or
" The beneficiary of an irrevocable trust is remote-that is, the benefi-
ciary is not eligible for current distributions or a distribution if the trust
154. Id. §§ 113.052(b), 113.053.
155. See infra text accompanying notes 223-24.
156. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.0035(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
157. Id. § 111.0035(b)(4).
158. Id. § 111.0035(b)(5)(A).
159. Id.
160. Id. § 111.0035(b)(5)(B).





The settlor may not restrict the power of a court to take action or exer-
cise jurisdiction. The statute provides a non-exclusive list of powers in-
cluded in this restriction:
* Modify, terminate, or take other action with regard to the trust
under Trust Code section 112.054,
* Remove a trustee under Trust Code section 113.082,
* Exercise jurisdiction over the trust under Trust Code section 115.001,
* Determine matters related to the trustee's bond (e.g., require, dis-
pense with, modify, or terminate the bond), and
* Adjust or deny compensation to a trustee who committed a breach
of trust.163
D. FIDUCIARY DUTY JURY INSTRUCTION
In Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley,164 a complex securities-fraud case, the
Supreme Court of Texas addressed the propriety of a jury instruction re-
garding breach of fiduciary duty under former Trust Code section
113.059.165 The instruction failed to reflect the possibility that the stan-
dard of care may be modified by agreement. Because the instruction did
not account for contractual modifications, the court determined that it
was overly broad and consequently defective. 166
E. DEFINITION OF "SETrLOR"
The Trust Code's definition of settlor was revised to make it clear that a
person who contributes property to the trust is encompassed within the
term. 167 In other words, the Trust Code provisions affecting a person
who creates a trust apply equally to a person who contributes property to
an existing trust.' 68
F. DEFINITION OF "BREACH OF TRUST"
The Trust Code now defines the term "breach of trust" as "a violation
by a trustee of a duty that the trustee owes to a beneficiary."' 169
162. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.0035(b)(5).
163. Id. § 111.0035(b).
164. 168 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2005).
165. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.0035 (Vernon Supp. 2006) (recodifying the sub-
stance of former § 113.059).
166. Sterling, 168 S.W.3d at 847.
167. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.004(14) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
168. Id.
169. Id. § 111.004(25).
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G. Acts NOT DEEMED ACCEPTANCE OF TRUST BY TRUSTEE
Trust Code section 112.009 was expanded to permit a person named as
a trustee to engage in certain conduct without having those acts be con-
sidered acts of acceptance. 170
1. Preservation of Trust Property
The named trustee may act to preserve the trust property without such
actions being deemed acceptance if the named trustee gives notice of the
rejection to either (1) the settlor, if living and competent, or (2) all bene-
ficiaries then entitled to receive trust distributions from the trust, if the
settlor is deceased or incapacitated. The named trustee must give this
notice within a reasonable time after acting to preserve the trust
property. 171
2. Inspection and Investigating Trust Property
The named trustee may inspect and investigate trust property for any
purpose, including determining the potential liability of the trust under
environmental laws, without having those acts being deemed
acceptance. 172
H. PET TRUSTS
Traditionally, a trust in favor of specific animals failed for a variety of
reasons, such as for being in violation of the rule against perpetuities be-
cause the measuring life was not human or for being an unenforceable
honorary trust because it lacked a human or legal entity as a beneficiary
who would have standing to enforce the trust. To get around this prob-
lem, pet owners who wanted to assure that their pets were properly cared
for after they died created a traditional trust, which indirectly provided
pet care by naming the person providing care to the pet as the trust's
actual beneficiary and by instructing the trustee to pay for the pet's ex-
penses (and perhaps a fee), according to the pet owner's directions, as
long as the beneficiary takes proper care of the pet. 173
With the enactment of Trust Code section 112.037, Texas joins the
growing number of states that authorize statutory pet trusts. 174 This type
of trust is a basic plan and does not require the pet owner to make as
many decisions regarding the terms of the trust. The statute "fills in the
gaps," so that a simple provision in a will such as, "I leave $1,000 in trust
for the care of my dog, Rover," may be effective.
170. Id. § 112.009.
171. Id. § 112.009(a)(1).
172. Id. § 112.009(a)(2).
173. See generally Gerry W. Beyer, Pet Animals: What Happens When Their Humans
Die?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 617 (2000).




The statute permits the pet owner to create a trust to provide for the
care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime (that is, not animals
born after the settlor's death). 175
2. Termination
The trust ends when the last surviving animal for which the trust was
created dies. 176
3. Enforcement
The settlor may appoint a person to enforce the trust. If the settlor
does not appoint an enforcer, the court may appoint someone. Any per-
son having an interest in the animal's welfare may request the court to
appoint a person to enforce the trust or remove a person previously
appointed. 177
4. Use of Property
a. General Rule
Property in the trust may be used only for the care of the animal unless
the exception discussed below applies. 178
b. Exception
If the court determines that the value of the trust property exceeds the
amount required for the care of the animals, the court may authorize the
trust property to be used in a different manner. In priority order, the
following is the list of ways in which the court may allow the excess prop-
erty to be used:
* As specified by the settlor in the trust,
" If the settlor is still alive, to the settlor,
" If the settlor is deceased and died testate, to those under the terms of
the settlor's will, or
* If the settlor is deceased and died intestate, to the settlor's heirs.179
5. Rule Against Perpetuities
Instead of exempting pet trusts from the rule against perpetuities, the
legislature created a special rule for determining measuring lives. The
measuring lives include:
" The human beneficiaries of the trust;
" The humans named in the trust instrument, even if not beneficiaries;
175. Id. § 112.037(a).
176. Id.
177. Id. § 112.037(b).
178. Id. § 112.037(c).
179. Id. § 112.037(d)-(e).
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- If the settlor is living when the trust becomes irrevocable, the settlor
of the trust; or
* If the settlor is not living when the trust becomes irrevocable, the
individuals who would have inherited the settlor's property had the set-
tlor died intestate when the trust became irrevocable. 180
I. SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
Trust Code section 112.035 was expanded to clarify the rules applicable
to spendthrift trusts. The key change helps assure that a surviving spouse
does not lose spendthrift protection under a bypass trust under specified
circumstances. The new language provides that "[a] beneficiary of [a]
trust [is] not considered to be a settlor, to have made a voluntary or invol-
untary transfer of the beneficiary's interest in the trust, or to have the
power to make a voluntary or involuntary transfer of the beneficiary's
interest in the trust, merely because the beneficiary . . . holds or exer-
cises" the following powers as a trustee or in another capacity:
- A presently exercisable "power to consume, invade, appropriate, or
distribute property to or for the benefit of the beneficiary, if the power is
[either] (i) exercisable only on consent of another person holding an in-
terest adverse to the beneficiary's interest; or (ii) limited by an ascertain-
able standard, including health, education, support, or maintenance of the
beneficiary;"
* A presently exercisable power to "appoint any property of the trust
to or for the benefit of a person other than the beneficiary, a creditor of
the beneficiary, the beneficiary's estate, or a creditor of the beneficiary's
estate;"
" "[A] testamentary power of appointment;" or
" A presently exercisable Crummey withdrawal power.' 8 '
J. DEVIATION
Trust Code section 112.054 was liberalized to permit the court to mod-
ify trusts in a greater number of situations than had previously been the
case. 182 Under both the old and new versions of this section, the court
may exercise its deviation powers if the purposes of the trust have been
fulfilled, have become illegal to fulfill, or have become impossible to ful-
fill. 183 The only additional ground under prior law was if "because of
circumstances not known to or anticipated by the settlor, compliance with
the terms of the trust would defeat or substantially impair the accom-
plishment of the purposes of the trust.' 8 4 The new version of section
180. Id. § 112.037(f).
181. Id. § 112.035(f).
182. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.054 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
183. Id.
184. Act of June 19, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 567, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3332, 3343




112.054 permits deviation in many additional situations including the
following:
e If "because of circumstances not known to or anticipated by the set-
tlor, the order will further the purpose of the trust;"18 5
* If "modification of administrative, nondispositive terms of the trust
is necessary or appropriate to prevent waste or avoid impairment of the
trust's administration.1 186
e If deviation is "necessary or appropriate to achieve the settlor's tax
objectives and is not contrary to the settlor's intentions[.]" 187 The court
may give this order retroactive effect, but whether retroactivity will be
recognized for tax purposes is problematic because recognition is a mat-
ter of federal, not state, law.
* If all beneficiaries have expressly consented to the deviation or are
deemed to have consented via virtual representation (section 115.013(c))
or through a guardian ad litem (Section 115.014).188 This provision legis-
latively overrules the Texas Supreme Court case of Frost National Bank
of San Antonio v. Newton, 189 in which the court held that "a court cannot
go beyond the face of the [trust] to make an ad hoc and speculative as-
sessment of which purposes the [settlor] considered 'primary' and which
he considered merely 'incidental.' "190
- If deviation is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust,
provided that all beneficiaries have expressly consented to the deviation
or are deemed to have consented via virtual representation (sec-
tion 115.013(c)) or through a guardian ad litem (section 115.014).191
When exercising its deviation power, the court is no longer bound to
follow the settlor's actual intent. Instead, the court only has to conform
to the settlors "probable" intention.1 92
K. DIVISION AND COMBINATION OF TRUSTS
Section 112.057 previously allowed a trustee to divide or merge trusts
with identical terms only if it was appropriate to achieve significant tax
savings. The 2005 Texas Legislature expanded this section by removing
the tax limitation and by providing that a division or combination may be
done so long as "the result does not impair the rights of any beneficiary
or adversely affect achievement of the purposes of the original trust. '193
185. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.054(a)(2).
186. Id. § 112.054(a)(3).
187. Id. § 112.054(a)(4).
188. Id. § 112.054(d).
189. 554 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. 1977).
190. Id. at 154.
191. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.054(a)(5)(B).
192. Id. § 112.054(b).




The 2005 legislature added section 113.003 to grant the trustee author-
ity to deal with options. These powers include the following:
* To "grant an option involving a sale, lease, or other disposition of
trust property ... ; [and]
* [To] acquire and exercise an option for the acquisition of
property."194
The trustee may take these actions with respect to options even if they
are exercisable beyond the duration of the trust. 195
M. DISTRIBUTIONS TO A MINOR OR AN INCAPACITATED BENEFICIARY
Two changes were made to section 113.021 of the Property Code, which
address distribution options if the beneficiary lacks legal capacity and the
trust instrument does not provide distribution instructions. The first
change is technical-the reference to a minor's custodian was updated to
reflect the enactment of the Texas Uniform Transfers to Minors Act in
1995.196 The second change gives the trust another distribution option-
to manage "the distribution as a separate fund on the beneficiary's be-
half, subject to the beneficiary's continuing right to withdraw the distribu-
tion. ' 197 Although the beneficiary would actually lack capacity to make a
withdrawal, the beneficiary's guardian would have capacity. In addition,
the trustee may continue to manage the property until the beneficiary
reaches the age of majority or regains capacity, thereby avoiding the need
for a guardianship. 198
N. DISTRIBUTION METHODS
Section 113.027 of the Property Code was added to provide the trustee
with guidance regarding the distribution of trust property and the division




" Allocation of assets in proportionate shares, or
" Allocation of assets in disproportionate shares. 199
The trustee may value the trust property to make the distributions and
then adjust the distribution, division, or termination to take account of
the resulting differences in valuation.20 0
194. Id. § 113.003.
195. Id.
196. Id. § 113.021(a)(4).
197. Id. § 113.021(a)(6).
198. Id. § 113.021(a).
199. Id. § 113.021(1), (2).
200. Id. § 113.027(3), (4).
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This authorization of non-pro-rata distributions was designed to rem-
edy a potentially significant federal income tax problem that could result
if the trust instrument did not expressly authorize this type of distribu-
tion. Under a 1969 Revenue Ruling, a non-pro-rata distribution is
treated as a pro-rata distribution, which is followed by exchanges be-
tween the beneficiaries.20 1 These exchanges could then subject the bene-
ficiaries to capital-gains tax.
0. BENEFICIARY'S RIGHT TO PROHIBIT TRUSTEE FROM SUING
In a provision effective on June 17, 2005, the Texas Legislature created
a method for a trust beneficiary to prevent a trustee from bringing certain
lawsuits that the trustee would otherwise institute to comply with the
trustee's fiduciary duties.202 A trustee may not prosecute or assert a
claim for damages if all of the following conditions are met:
* The claim is one for damages-that is, the claim is not for some other
remedy,
" The potential defendant is not a beneficiary of the trust,
* The trustee is not bringing the action in the trustee's individual ca-
pacity, and
* Each beneficiary gives written notice to the trustee of the benefici-
ary's opposition to the trustee's pursuing the claim.
A trustee who does not prosecute or assert a claim under this provision is
protected from the liability that might otherwise attach for failing to pur-
sue the claim. 20 3
P. DUTY OF "GOOD FAITH"
The 2005 Texas Legislature codified the trustee's common-law duty to
administer the trust in good faith.2°4
Q. BOND
Section 113.058 was revised to grant the court the authority to excuse a
non-corporate trustee from the requirement of giving bond, even if the
settlor did not waive bond in the trust instrument.20 5
R. DUTY TO INFORM BENEFICIARIES
The 2005 Texas Legislature codified the common-law duty of the trus-
tee to fully disclose to the beneficiaries all material facts that might affect
their rights.206 Section 113.060 provides that the trustee must keep the
beneficiaries reasonably informed regarding (1) the administration of the
201. Rev. Rul. 69-486, 1969-2 C.B. 159.
202. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.028 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
203. Id. § 113.028(a), (c).
204. Id. § 113.051.
205. Id. § 113.058.




trust and (2) the material facts that the beneficiary needs to protect his or
her interests. 20 7
The settlor may, however, limit this duty if the trust is revocable or if
the beneficiary is either (1) under age twenty-five or (2) remote-that is,
the beneficiary is not eligible for current distributions or a distribution if
the trust were to terminate.208
S. SUBSTITUTE FIDUCIARY AcT
The ability of corporations to rely on transactions made in compliance
with the Substitute Fiduciary Act and related Texas statutes was en-
hanced by Wood v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., N.A. 209 The settlors
named a particular corporation as trustee of their trusts. After a series of
corporate buyouts, mergers, and the formation of subsidiary trust compa-
nies, a new corporation became the trustee of these trusts. Despite com-
pliance with the Substitute Fiduciary Act,2 10 the beneficiaries of these
trusts objected when the trust company was sold to a third party. The
trial court ruled against the beneficiaries, who subsequently appealed. 211
The appellate court affirmed. The court explained that the benefi-
ciaries received proper notice of the fiduciary substitution under the Act
and failed to object. The court also denied the beneficiaries' claims that
the Act was designed for use only as a consolidating tool. Rather, the
court explained that the Act does not require the fiduciary substitution to
result in a consolidation, and the court was unwilling to read into the Act
a requirement not evident from the plain language of the statute. The
court also examined legislative history and found nothing to support the
beneficiaries' claims. Accordingly, the court determined that it was ac-
ceptable for the Act to be used to de-consolidate, as well as consolidate,
fiduciary appointments.2 12
The court also rejected the application of the common-law principle
that a trustee may not resign or transfer the office as trustee for a mone-
tary consideration. The court explained that the transfers in this case
were statutorily authorized and that the corporate entities involved com-
plied with the applicable statutes.213
T. REMOVAL OF TRUSTEE
Section 113.082 of the Texas Property Code was revised to change an
outdated reference from an "incompetent" trustee to an "incapacitated"
trustee. In addition, a repetitive statement that the court has the discre-
207. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.060 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
208. Id. § 111.0035(b)(5).
209. 170 S.W.3d 885 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, pet. denied).
210. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 274.101-.203 (Vernon 1998) (substantially similar to pre-
codification version of the Act).
211. Wood, 170 S.W.3d at 887-89.
212. Id. at 888-91.
213. Id. at 892-93.
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tion to remove a trustee was deleted.2 14
U. MULTIPLE TRUSTEES
The rules regarding how multiple trustees may exercise trust powers
were revised and expanded.215
1. Majority May Act
Consistent with prior law, cotrustees who are unable to reach a unani-
mous decision may act by a simple majority; common law had required
unanimity. 216
2. Vacancies
Also consistent with prior law, the remaining trustees may act for the
trust when a vacancy occurs.217
3. Duty of Cotrustee to Participate
Section 113.085(c) codifies the cotrustee's duty to participate in trust
administration.218 However, a cotrustee is excused from this duty under
the following circumstances:
* The cotrustee is unavailable (for instance, the cotrustee is absent, ill,
disqualified, or is temporarily incapacitated). If a cotrustee is unavailable
and prompt action is necessary to achieve the trust's purposes or to avoid
injury to the trust property, the remaining cotrustee or a majority of the
remaining cotrustees may act for the trust.2 19
- The cotrustee has complied either with applicable law or the terms of
the trust in delegating the performance of a trust function. To use this
exception, the cotrustee must (1) communicate the delegation to all the
other cotrustees and (2) file the delegation in the trust records. 220
4. Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care
A cotrustee must "exercise reasonable care to (1) prevent [another]
cotrustee from committing a serious [but not minor] breach of trust, and
(2) compel a cotrustee to redress a serious [but not minor] breach of
trust.' '22 1 The Code provides no guidance on how a court should deter-
mine whether a breach is serious or minor-whether it is the amount of
money involved, the moral depravity of the breach, or some other factor.
214. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 113.082 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
215. Id. § 113.085.
216. Id. § 113.085(a).
217. Id. § 113.085(b).
218. Id. § 113.085(c).
219. Id. § 113.085(d).
220. Id. § 113.085(c)(2).





A cotrustee who does not join in an action of another cotrustee is not
liable for the cotrustee's action unless the non-joining cotrustee breached
his duty to exercise reasonable care.222
b. Dissenting-But-Joining Cotrustee
A cotrustee who joins in an action at the direction of the majority of
the trustees is not liable for the action if both of the following are true:
" The cotrustee exercised reasonable care, and
* The cotrustee gave written notice of the dissent to any cotrustee at or
before the time of the action. 223
V. DELEGATION OF DUTIES TO COTRUSTEES
During this Survey period, the rules regarding when a cotrustee may
delegate duties to another cotrustee were also codified. The subsection
grants a cotrustee the right to delegate the performance of a duty, unless
the settlor specifically directed that a particular trust function be per-
formed jointly. The cotrustee may revoke a delegation at any time, un-
less the cotrustee expressly made the delegation irrevocable. 224
W. COMMON TRUST FUNDS
The Texas Legislature fixed an outdated reference in the common trust
fund statute to the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act to reflect the Texas pas-
sage of the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, which occurred in 1995.225
X. TRUST PROTECTORS
The Texas Legislature modernized section 114.003 of the Property
Code to reflect the increased use of trust protectors.2 26
1. Authorization
The settlor may grant a trustee or a third party the "power to direct the
modification or termination of the trust." 227
2. Duty of Trustee
Normally, the trustee must follow the instructions of the trust protec-
tor. However, the trustee does not have to follow those instructions
under the following circumstances:
222. Id. § 114.006(a).
223. Id. § 114.006(c).
224. Id. § 113.085(e).
225. Id. § 113.171(a) (emphasis added).
226. Id. § 114.003.
227. Id. § 114.003(a).
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* The protector's instruction is manifestly contrary to the terms of the
trust, or
* The trustee knows that the instruction would constitute a serious
breach of the protector's fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries.
228
3. Duty of Protector
A protector is presumed to be a fiduciary who is required to act in
good faith with regard to the purposes of the trust and the interests of the
beneficiaries. However, a beneficiary who is also a protector is excluded
from this presumption.229
4. Liability of Protector
A protector is liable for any loss that results from a breach of the pro-
tector's fiduciary duty.230
Y. EXCULPATION OF TRUSTEE
The 2005 Texas Legislature recodified the rules regarding the ability of
a settlor to exculpate the trustee for breach of duty from section 113.059
of the Property Code to newly created section 114.007.231 The new sec-
tion makes it clear that, except for the restrictions imposed by section
111.0035,232 the settlor may include terms exculpating the trustee as
follows:
a To relieve the trustee from a duty or restriction imposed by (1) the
Trust Code or (2) common law, and
* To direct or permit the trustee to do or not to do an action that
would otherwise violate a duty or restriction imposed by (1) the Trust
Code or (2) common law.233
Z. REMEDIES FOR BEACH OF TRUST
In newly created section 114.008, the Texas Legislature compiled the
available remedies for a breach of trust that has either occurred or might
occur in the future. The remedies, as listed below, were most likely avail-
able under prior law either through the Trust Code or common law:
* Compel the trustee to perform the trustee's duty or;
* Enjoin the trustee from committing a breach of trust;
* Compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust (e.g., by paying
money or restoring property);
* Order an accounting;
228. Id. § 114.003(b).
229. Id. § 114.003(c).
230. Id.
231. Id. § 114.007.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 152-63.
233. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.007(c) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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o Appoint a receiver to take possession of the trust property and [to]
administer the trust,
" Suspend the trustee;
" Remove the trustee under Section 113.082;
" Reduce or deny trustee compensation;
" Void an act of the trustee;
" Impose a lien or a constructive trust on [the] trust property;234 or
• Trace trust property that was improperly disposed of and recover the
property or its proceeds.
Note that the latter three remedies are not available if granting the
remedy would injure a person (other than a beneficiary) who (1) acted
without knowledge of the trustee's improper conduct or (2) dealt with the
trustee in good faith and for value.235
AA. JURISDICTION
1. Generally
The 2005 Texas Legislature clarified the court's involvement with an
ongoing trust by revising section 115.001(c) of the Property Code. This
section now explains that the court may intervene in the administration of
a trust to the extent that an interested person or an applicable law in-
vokes the court's jurisdiction.2 36 This involvement, however, does not re-
sult in the trust being subject to continuing judicial supervision unless the
court so orders. 237
2. Section 142.005 Management Trusts
Subsection (d) of section 115.001 was amended to make it clear that the
district court's jurisdiction over trusts is not exclusive if another court
creates a section 142.005 management trust.238 Likewise, section
142.005(d) was revised to provide that a court that creates a section
142.005 trust "has continuing jurisdiction and supervisory power over the
trust, including the power to construe, amend, revoke, modify, or termi-
nate the trust. '239
BB. NECESSARY PARTIES TO A TRUST ACTION
Section 115.011 of the Property Code was revised to eliminate confu-
sion regarding the persons who are necessary parties to a trust action. As
previously written, anyone who was designated by name in the instru-
ment creating the trust could arguably be a necessary party, even if that
person had absolutely no interest in the trust. For example, a named trus-
234. Id. § 114.008(a)(1)-(9).
235. Id. § 114.008(b).
236. Id. § 115.001(a), (b).
237. Id. § 115.001(c).
238. Id. § 115.001(d).
239. Id. § 142.005(d).
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tee who refused to serve and a beneficiary named in the non-trust portion
of a will creating a testamentary trust could both have fallen within the
scope of necessary parties. The amendment provides that only a benefici-
ary who is designated by name is a necessary party and that only a trustee
who is serving at the time the action is filed is a necessary party.2 40
CC. GUARDIAN AD LITEM
Under new section 115.014(c), a guardian ad litem may now consider
the general benefit accruing to the living members of the represented per-
son's family.2 41
DD. A-rrORNEY's FEES
Hachar v. Hachar242 reminds litigants that any party involved in trust
litigation should seek an award of attorney's fees under Trust Code sec-
tion 114.064 because the court has the authority to award fees even in
favor of the losing party if the court believes that it is equitable and just
to make such an award. After reviewing a complex factual background,
the trial court awarded attorney's fees from the trust in favor of both the
trustee and the beneficiaries who were involved in litigation against each
other. The beneficiaries argued that the court's award in favor of the
trustee was inappropriate because the trustee was not the prevailing party
in the lawsuit. The appellate court, however, held that the trial court
could make the award because Trust Code section 114.064 permitted the
court to make an award that was "equitable and just."'24 3 There is no
limitation that an award of reasonable and necessary attorney's fees be
made only in favor of a prevailing party.
244
The appellate court next considered whether the court's award of attor-
ney's fees in favor of the beneficiaries was appropriate. The court ex-
plained that "[u]nreasonable fees cannot be awarded, even if the court
believes them just, but the court may conclude that it is not equitable or
just to award even reasonable and necessary fees."'245 To this end, the
trustee contended that the amount awarded was neither (1) equitable and
just nor (2) reasonable and necessary. The appellate court disagreed,
finding that the trial court's determination that the fees satisfied both
conditions was not in error.246
The appellate court also held that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in not awarding conditional appellate attorney's fees. The court
explained that the award of appellate attorney's fees is not required and
that the trial court may have originally decided against awarding such
240. Id. § 115.011(b)(2), (4). The other ways that a party may qualify as a necessary
party were not changed by the amendment.
241. Id. § 115.014(c).
242. 153 S.W.3d 138 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet.).
243. Id. at 142 (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 114.064 (Vernon 1995)).
244. Id. at 141-42.
245. Id. at 142.
246. Id. at 143.
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fees to discourage an appeal which, given the "tortured history" of the
case, would be a reasonable thing to do.247
EE. UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME AcT
1. Trustee's Power to Adjust
Before this Survey period, the trustee could not make an adjustment
that would diminish the income interest of a trust that requires all of the
trust income to be paid at least annually to a spouse and for which an
estate or gift tax marital deduction would be allowed if the trustee did not
have the power to adjust.2 4 8 The 2005 Texas Legislature removed this
restriction. The removal was triggered by the issuance of a Treasury Reg-
ulation, which provides that an adjustment that meets the regulation's
requirements does not disqualify a trust for QTIP treatment even if it
reduces trust income.249
2. Deferred Compensation, Annuities, and Similar Payments
As originally enacted in 2003, Trust Code section 116.172, which ex-
plains how deferred, compensation, annuity, and similar payments are al-
located, contained "garbled language" that made the section "almost
impossible to administer. ' 250 The 2005 Texas Legislature revised this lan-
guage to reflect what the drafters of the 2003 legislation intended.251
FF. APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER
Krumnow v. Krumnow252 explains how the appointment of a receiver
as a remedy in a trust situation is justified only in extreme cases-if this
remedy appears to be the only way to preserve or protect the property in
litigation. In Krumnow, a district court appointed a receiver on its own
motion, without notice to the fiduciary holding the property, to take con-
trol over various properties involved in a will and inter vivos trust dis-
pute. The appellate court determined that the court abused its discretion
in issuing this order. The court explained that "[r]eceivership is an ex-
traordinarily harsh remedy and one that courts are particularly loathe to
utilize. '25 3 The court noted that both the trust and estate property were
currently being managed by a fiduciary; thus, there was no great emer-
gency or imperious necessity for a receiver. Rather, the status of the
property could be maintained by a less drastic remedy such as a re-
straining order or temporary injunction.254
247. Id. at 144.
248. Glenn M. Karisch, 2005 Texas Legislative Update: Changes in Trust Probate &
Guardianship Law, June 26, 2005, available at http://www.texasprobate.com/05leg/2005leg
update.pdf.
249. Id. (discussing Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)-1 (2004)).
250. Id.
251. Id.; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 116.172 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
252. 174 S.W.3d 820 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, pet. filed).
253. Id. at 828.
254. Id. at 830.
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GG. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S INVOLVEMENT
WITH CHARITABLE TRUSTS
1. Notice Time
Effective September 1, 2005, a party initiating a proceeding involving a
charitable trust must give the attorney general a longer time to respond
before a hearing. Notice must now be given no less than twenty-five
days, rather than ten days, before the hearing. 255
2. Exempt Proceedings
To prevent the attorney general's office from being unnecessarily bom-
barded with notices, the 2005 Texas Legislature exempted the following
proceedings from the notice requirement:
* An uncontested application that exclusively seeks to admit a will to
probate. The exception applies regardless of whether the application is to
probate the will as a muniment of title or is coupled with a request for the
appointment of a personal representative. 256
* All proceedings except those under Probate Code section 83 (appli-
cations pertaining to a second application to probate a will) from the no-
tice requirement. This second exception is poorly worded, and its true
impact is problematic. It is likely, however, that this result, triggered by
the use of a double-negative, was not the legislature's intent. It is likely
that the legislature actually meant to exempt second applications under
section 83 from the notice requirement. 257
HH. PROBATE CODE SECTION 867 MANAGEMENT TRUSTS2 5 8
1. Proper Applicants
During the Survey period, the list of persons who may apply for the
creation of a section 867 management trust was expanded. 259 Under
prior law, only guardians, guardians ad litem, and attorneys ad litem
could petition the court for the creation of a management trust. The stat-
ute now provides the following comprehensive list of proper applicants:
* Guardians of the estate, person, or estate and person;
* Ad litems, attorneys, or guardians, who are appointed to represent
the ward or the ward's interests;
* "[A] person interested in the welfare of an alleged incapacitated per-
son who does not have a guardian of the estate;" and 260
255. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 123.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
256. Id. § 123.003(a)(1).
257. Id. § 123.003(c)(2).
258. The changes discussed in this section apply to an application filed on or after
September 1, 2005. Non-substantive and clarifying changes to the provisions governing
section 867 management trusts are not reviewed.
259. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 867 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
260. Id. § 867(a-1).
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* Ad litems, attorneys or guardians, who are appointed to represent an
alleged incapacitated person, or the person's interests, who does not have
a guardian.
2. Creation of Trust for Incapacitated Person Without a Guardian
The 2005 Texas Legislature authorized the court to create a section 867
trust for an incapacitated person not already subject to a guardianship. 261
The statute now permits the court to do so it if finds that the following are
true after conducting a proper hearing:
* The person is incapacitated. The court must use the same proce-
dures and evidentiary standards as required in a hearing for the appoint-
ment of a guardian in making its determination of incapacity.262
- The creation of the trust is in the person's best interests. If the court
determines that the person is incapacitated but that the creation of the
trust is not in the person's best interests, the court may appoint a guard-
ian without the necessity of a separate proceeding. 263
An application to create a trust for an incapacitated person must be
filed in the same court in which a guardianship proceeding is pending for
the same incapacitated person.264
3. Venue
A new section provides that if a proceeding for the appointment of a
guardian for an alleged incapacitated person is not pending on the date
that the application is filed, venue is determined in the same manner as
venue for the appointment of a guardian under Probate Code section
610.265
4. Presumption of Incapacity
The 2005 Texas Legislature restored a provision removed in 2003,
which provided that a person who has a temporary guardian under sec-
tion 875 may not be presumed to be incapacitated. 266 This makes sense
because temporary guardianship proceedings do not have all of the safe-
guards of a formal guardianship.
V. OTHER ESTATE-PLANNING MATTERS
A. JOINT ACCOUNTS
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Beyer267 demonstrates that although ex-
trinsic evidence may not be used to prove the survivorship feature of a
261. Id. § 867(b-1).
262. Id. § 867(b-3).
263. Id. § 867(b-4).
264. Id. § 867(b-2).
265. Id. § 867A.
266. Id. § 874.
267. 170 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, pet. filed) (litigants with the surname of
Beyer are not related to the author of this article).
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joint account so as to claim the funds in the account itself, such evidence
may be used to show the depositor's intent in an action against the finan-
cial institution. Father and Daughter established a joint account with
rights of survivorship. For tax reasons, the account was converted into a
single-party account in Father's name. Later, Father told his broker over
the telephone that he wanted Daughter's name added back to the ac-
count. The broker prepared documents reflecting the change and deliv-
ered them to Daughter, who gave them to Father to sign. Daughter left
the documents with the broker's receptionist. Later, the broker could not
locate the new joint-account agreement despite a diligent search. Before
Father could sign a replacement agreement, he lapsed into a coma and
died. A dispute arose over whether the balance of the funds in the ac-
count, over $1 million, belonged to Daughter or passed to Father's six
children by intestacy. Daughter settled the dispute with her siblings by
agreeing to share the account equally with them.268
Daughter then sued the brokerage firm for the difference between the
balance in the account and the one-sixth share she received. The jury
determined that the brokerage firm was liable under six theories. Daugh-
ter elected to recover under contract. The brokerage firm appealed. 269
On appeal, the brokerage firm argued that the trial court improperly
admitted extrinsic evidence of Father's intent for the account to have the
survivorship feature. The court recognized that Texas courts consistently
hold that, in the absence of a written agreement as described in Probate
Code section 439(a), extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to prove rights of
survivorship against the depositor's estate.2 70 However, Daughter was
not seeking a recovery from Father's estate or against a party to the joint
account. Instead, she was attempting to recover from the brokerage firm
for losing the survivorship agreement and thereby breaching its contract
with Daughter and Father to create a joint account with rights of survi-
vorship. 27 1 Therefore, the appellate court affirmed.
B. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
In Hardy v. Robinson,272 the principal signed a statutory durable power
of attorney. In the "special instructions" section, he explained that he
wanted certain litigation in which he was involved to continue with the
proceeds held in trust for his sons. The principal died within hours of
signing the power of attorney. The trial court held that this language was
268. Id. at 687-90.
269. Id. at 690.
270. Id. at 691 (citing Stauffer v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 858, 865 (Tex. 1990)).
271. Id. at 690. The court also held that (1) the parol evidence rule did not bar the
admission of the extrinsic evidence, (2) Daughter's agreement with her siblings did not act
to waive her contract claim against the brokerage firm, and (3) the trial court's award of
appellate fees should have been made contingent on an unsuccessful appeal by the broker-
age firm. Id. at 693-96.
272. 170 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, no pet.).
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sufficient to create a trust.2 73
The appellate court reversed. The court first examined the document
and found that it was a statutory durable power of attorney under Pro-
bate Code section 482. Consequently, under long-standing Texas law, it
had to be strictly construed. Strictly construed, the principal's special in-
structions granted his agent powers that he might not otherwise have had
the right to exercise, but the language did not act to create a trust.274
The court also held that the principal did not create an oral trust. Al-
though an oral trust of personal property is enforceable under certain
circumstances, there was no evidence that the trust was funded, that is,
that the principal actually transferred his rights in the lawsuit to the agent
as a trustee. The court also explained that the only evidence of trust in-
tent was the special instructions in the power of attorney, which granted
the agent the power to create a trust but did not itself create a trust.275
C. ANATOMICAL GiFrs
Over the past several years, there has been considerable debate as to
whether a statement indicating that a person is an organ donor on a
driver's license would be effective. The law has changed several times.
The 2005 Texas Legislature restored the effectiveness of the driver's li-
cense statement after being deauthorized most recently in 1997.276
273. Id. at 778-79.
274. Id. at 779-81.
275. Id. at 781-82.
276. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 521.401-.405 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
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